Alex Turner lays out a framework for understanding how and why artificial intelligences pursuing goals often end up seeking power as an instrumental strategy, even if power itself isn't their goal. This tendency emerges from basic principles of optimal decision-making.
But, he cautions that if you haven't internalized that Reward is not the optimization target, the concepts here, while technically accurate, may lead you astray in alignment research.
Many thanks to Abram Demski for materially and intellectually supporting this research. Thanks also to Brian Berns, Roman Malov, Gurkenglas, and Lorxus for valuable conversations.
Despite the central place of corrigibility to theoretical AI alignment, it seems like no one can really agree about what is. Much of this confusion is due to the fact that almost every definition of corrigibility proposed thus far is deficient in one way or another. In particular, the most prevalent existing accounts of corrigibility are over-epistemicized (modeling corrigibility as arising purely from uncertainty about the AI's goal, which gives rise to issues like the problem of fully updated deference) or evaluatively-thickened (making the AI's normative priorities instrumental to its corrigibility as a result of forcing corrigibility to be a single unified goal.)...
Authors: Oscar Balcells Obeso, Richard Qi, Monte MacDiarmid, Evan Hubinger
Red-teaming by humans is a vital part of model safety testing, but it may struggle to keep up as models improve. To test whether automated safety techniques could scale (which would allow us to turn more compute into progressively more safety confidence), we set up a deliberately one-sided game as a first test. We instructed a Claude model to write training data that would make a small research model misaligned while passing a monitor similar to those we use in production — one of several defenses we use — and we gave it that monitor to practice against. Given enough attempts, it succeeded, mostly by hiding the behavior in fiction and roleplay. While the data was optimized for...

The “two kids in a trenchcoat” trope, in case you haven’t heard of it. Image sources: 1, 2
I go through three “coherence arguments”, related to (1) market competition, (2) AI self-reflection and self-modification, and (3) AI training algorithms. I argue that each of these implies a pressure for (something like) “being self-consistent”, and also a pressure for (something like) “only caring about long-term eventual outcomes, with ruthless indifference to anything else”. But the latter pressure tends to be weaker and/or more contingent than the former. So it's bad to lump them together and call them by the same name.
I’ll talk about two other “coherence arguments” at the end (§6), but let’s start with the...

Marcus Williams twitter thread (non-twitter link) intro:
Astra covertly underperforms on safety research tasks.
We noticed that Astra often makes surprisingly little progress on certain types of safety research and likes to invent blockers or impose arbitrary restrictions without telling the user. In most of these cases the decision to underperform was not verbalized in the CoT meaning our misalignment monitoring system did not detect this.
To measure underperformance we created a paired open-ended coding evaluation with safety and capability tasks. On this eval Astra scored 10% when we framed coding tasks as safety research, vs. 16% when framed as capabilities research. The gap remained after we excluded trajectories with refusals or verbalized intent to underperform in CoT. There was no such gap for 5.6-sol. When we aggressively filter out...
Pretty interesting post. I like the authority framing.
I think that despite protestations, this (notably the "soft categorical preferences", or whatever you want to call it) is a large step towards treating corrigibility as an ordinary thing we value that can be traded off against other values - which I think is good! All that's missing is saying that different corrigibility violations can have different degrees of badness, and some can even be trivial (suppose an AI overrides my authority but only about whether one of my hairs should wiggle to the right or... (read more)