Mostly orthogonal:
Other relevant differences are
basically every company eventually becomes a moral maze
Agreed, but Silicon Valley wisdom says founder-led and -controlled companies are exceptionally dynamic, which matters here because the company that deploys AGI is reasonably likely to be one of those. For such companies, the personality and ideological commitments of the founder(s) are likely more predictive of external behavior than properties of moral mazes.
Facebook's pivot to the "metaverse", for instance, likely could not have been executed by a moral maze. If we believed that Facebook / Meta was o...
Also, on a re-read I notice that all the examples given in the post relate to mathematics or theoretical work, which is almost uniquely serial among human activities. By contrast, engineering disciplines are typically much more parallelizable, as evidenced by the speedup in technological progress during war-time.
I like the distinction between parallelizable and serial research time, and agree that there should be a very high bar for shortening AI timelines and eating up precious serial time.
One caveat to the claim that we should prioritize serial alignment work over parallelizable work, is that this assumes an omniscient and optimal allocator of researcher-hours to problems. Insofar as this assumption doesn't hold (because our institutions fail, or because the knowledge about how to allocate researcher-hours itself depends on the outcomes of parallelizable research) the distinction between parallelizable and serial work breaks down and other considerations dominate.
This is very helpful as a roadmap connecting current interpretability techniques to the techniques we need for alignment.
One thing that seems very important but missing is how the tech tree looks if we factor in how SOTA models will change over time, including
For example, if we restricted our attention ...
** Explain why cooperative inverse reinforcement learning doesn’t solve the alignment problem.
Feedback: I clicked through to the provided answer and had a great deal of difficulty understanding how it was relevant - it makes a number of assumptions about agents and utility functions and I wasn't able to connect it to why I should expect an agent trained using CIRL to kill me.
FWIW here's my alternative answer:
...CIRL agents are bottlenecked on the human overseer's ability to provide them with a learning signal through demonstration or direct communi
I don't think I buy the argument for why process-based optimization would be an attractor. The proposed mechanism - an evaluator maintaining an "invariant that each component has a clear role that makes sense independent of the global objective" - would definitely achieve this, but why would the system maintainers add such an invariant? In any concrete deployment of a process-based system, they would face strong pressure to optimize end-to-end for the outcome metric.
I think the way process-based systems could actually win the race is something closer...
Thank you for putting numbers on it!
Is this an unconditionally prediction of 60% chance of existential catastrophe due to deceptive alignment alone? In contrast to the commonly used 10% chance of existential catastrophe due to all AI sources this century. Or do you mean that, conditional on there being an existential catastrophe due to AI, 60% chance it will be caused by deceptive alignment, and 40% by other problems like misuse or outer alignment?
Amongst the LW crowd I'm relatively optimistic, but I'm not that optimistic. I would give maybe 20% total risk of misalignment this century. (I'm generally expecting singularity this century with >75% chance such that most alignment risk ever will be this century.)
The number is lower if you consider "how much alignment risk before AI systems are in the driver's seat," which I think is very often the more relevant question, but I'd still put it ... (read more)
Unconditional. I'm rather more pessimistic than an overall 10% chance. I usually give ~80% chance of existential risk from AI.