This post became the paper Corrigibility Transformation: Constructing Goals That Accept Updates. The paper is more up to date, and after many rounds of edits for clarity, I believe a better introduction to the main idea.
Ensuring that AI agents are corrigible, meaning they do not take actions to preserve their existing goals, is a critical component of almost any plan for alignment. It allows for humans to modify their goal specifications for an AI, as well as for AI agents to learn goal specifications over time, without incentivizing the AI to interfere with that process. As an extreme example of corrigibility’s value, a corrigible paperclip maximizer could be stopped partway through a non-instantaneous takeover attempt by saying “please stop” or by automatically triggered safeguards, and it would...
This sounds ELK-like, and I don't see it in the paper. Can you clarify how this happens? If I'm understanding you correctly, you're suggesting a machine that reads the transformed-agent's mind and checks for a prediction that its actions will lead to the shutdown channels being disabled and, upon detecting that prediction, shuts the agent down? Is that right?
I'll start with this question, since it's a bit distinct from the others. The machine that I'm thinking of could be another head a neural-network based model, where the second head is trained to make p...
So, with regards to the Navier-Stokes story:
Part of it is an implication that OpenAI accessed user data in order to then internally prompt and/or train their models using it. Some people are now claiming that this is totally impossible, that there are strict controls regarding who can access user data, and that it would be suicide for OpenAI to be doing anything like this.
But: A while back, there was this school-shooting incident whose perpetrator consulted ChatGPT beforehand. According to OpenAI's own statements, their safety classifiers flagged the relev...
Here's a simple example where this solution concepts works as expected. Consider any game which is a "generalized stag-hunt": that is, it contains a unique Pareto-efficient payoff.
Consider a Pareto-efficient strategy profile
OpenAI claimed Astra is their most aligned model and showed various specific misaligned behaviors going from a high rate with GPT-5.6 Sol to ~zero with Astra. I'm worried that Astra is significantly more misaligned than various metrics indicate: if you (implicitly or explicitly) train against the misbehavior you can detect, it's easy to end up with an AI that is no more interested in pursuing user intent but which has learned to only cheat/misbehave when it won...
TurnTrout discusses a common misconception in reinforcement learning: that reward is the optimization target of trained agents. He argues reward is better understood as a mechanism for shaping cognition, not a goal to be optimized, and that this has major implications for AI alignment approaches.
No, as I hinted at:
I think reward seeking would become less likely but I'd be surprised if it eliminated reward-seeking from more than 1/3 of settings (as I think it's an exploration issue).