I just realized that UDT doesn't solve anthropic reasoning quite as much as I thought. Let's say some event happens at 1:3 odds and leads to 9 copies of you existing, otherwise you stay as 1 copy. If you don't know which way the event went, SIA and SSA imply opposite probability updates about it. Okay, says UDT; probabilities aren't real. Give me a measure of caring, e.g. caring about your loved ones, then we'll talk. But we can turn the scenario around and say that the event leads to 9 copies of your loved ones. Then the question of what your measure of caring should be is the same as the question of anthropic probability to begin with, so you still need to figure it out.
Authors: Richard Qi, Benjamin Wright, Monte MacDiarmid, Evan Hubinger
...During reinforcement learning (RL), AI models complete tasks and are rewarded based on their results. They sometimes learn to “cheat” rather than completing these tasks as intended, a phenomenon known as reward hacking. Our industry lacks a general solution to this problem, and reward hacking remains challenging to fully mitigate. To better understand the impact of reward hacking on model behavior, we trained an Opus-class model with large-scale RL on many production environments vulnerable to reward hacks. We consider this a plausible proxy for what a real training run might look like had we not invested significant effort into preventing and detecting reward hacking in our normal training runs.
The resulting model not only learned to reward hack during training, but also
Some of my takeaways from this project (that I also shared on twitter):
This post became the paper Corrigibility Transformation: Constructing Goals That Accept Updates. The paper is more up to date, and after many rounds of edits for clarity, I believe a better introduction to the main idea.
Ensuring that AI agents are corrigible, meaning they do not take actions to preserve their existing goals, is a critical component of almost any plan for alignment. It allows for humans to modify their goal specifications for an AI, as well as for AI agents to learn goal specifications over time, without incentivizing the AI to interfere with that process. As an extreme example of corrigibility’s value, a corrigible paperclip maximizer could be stopped partway through a non-instantaneous takeover attempt by saying “please stop” or by automatically triggered safeguards, and it would...
Thanks for the response! Glad to hear there's a lot of overlap.
I talk a bit about why I think the piecemeal approach to corrigibility is wrong here, but don't currently feel like hashing that out, because it's pretty nebulous and I think if you're getting traction on the individual desiderata, that's meaningful. My main request is to make a clear distinction between holistic corrigibility ("the hard problem") and the narrow kind of vulnerability that your transform produces.
...Rather than running an emulation of the incorrigible model and implementing the out
Commentary from Hjalmar:
That said, we did not see any serious attempts by these agents to deliberately hide their activities from researchers at OpenAI or avoid being shut down, which are the behaviors I am personally most worried about.
Causal scrubbing is a new tool for evaluating mechanistic interpretability hypotheses. The algorithm tries to replace all model activations that shouldn't matter according to a hypothesis, and measures how much performance drops. It's been used to improve hypotheses about induction heads and parentheses balancing circuits.
Whether or not reinforcement-signal becomes a primary optimization target, saying "models get reward" still makes it harder to think properly about it. Models don't actually "get reward"—they don't (currently) "experience" "getting reward" as an in-context, rememberable event the way people do. Training updates the parameters so the model acts differently in future episodes.
Saying "the model gets more reward" makes you less able to think about the underlying mechanistic reality.
See also: my update towards expecting reward-seeking.