Modal Fixpoint Cooperation without Löb's Theorem

Here's a simple Kripke frame proof of Payor's lemma.

Let be a Kripke frame over our language, i.e. $W$ is a set of possible worlds, $R$ is an accessibility relation, and $⊩$ judges that a sentence holds in a world. Now, suppose for contradiction that $W ⊩ x \leftrightarrow □ (□ x \to x)$ but that $W ⊮ x$ , i.e. $x$ does not hold in some world $u \in W$ .

A bit of De Morganing tells us that the hypothesis on $x$ is equivalent to $\neg x \leftrightarrow ◊ (□ x \land \neg x)$ , so $u ⊩ ◊ (□ x \land \neg x)$ . So, there is some world $v$ with $u R v$ such that $v ⊩ □ x \land \neg x$ . But again looking at our equivalent form for $\neg x$ , we see that $W ⊩ \neg x \to ◊ \neg x$ , so $v ⊩ □ x \land ◊ \neg x$ , a contradiction. $□$

Both this proof and the proof in the post are very simple, but at least for me I feel like this proof tells me a bit more about what's going on, or at least tells me something about what's going on that the other doesn't. Though in a broader sense there's a lot I don't know about what's going on in modal fixed points.

Kripke frame-style semantics are helpful for thinking about lots of modal logic things. In particular, there are cool inductiony interpretations of the Gödel/Löb theorems. These are more complicated, but I'd be happy to talk about them sometime.

[-]James Payor3y70

Thanks! I also wrote up my proof in another comment, which should help triangulate intuition.

[-]SamEisenstat3y70

Nice, I like this proof also. Maybe there's a clearer way to say thing, but your "unrolling one step" corresponds to my going from to $v$ . We somehow need to "look two possible worlds deep".

[-]James Payor3y*147

Also, here's a proof that a bot is never exploited. It only cooperates when its partner $B$ provably cooperates.

First, note that $A \to □ A$ , i.e. if $A$ cooperates it provably cooperates. (Proof sketch: $A \leftrightarrow □ X \to □ □ X \leftrightarrow □ A$ .)

Now we show that $A \to □ B$ (i.e. if $A$ chooses to cooperate, its partner is provably cooperating):

We get $A \to (□ □ A \to □ B)$ by distributing.
We get $A \to □ □ A$ by applying internal necessitation to $A \to □ A$ .
By (1) and (2), $A \to □ B$ .

(PS: we can strengthen this to $A \leftrightarrow □ B$ , by noticing that $□ B \to □ (□ A \to B) \leftrightarrow A$ .)

[-]James Payor3y60

A point of confusion: is it enough to prove that ? What about $A \to B$ ? I'm not sure I can say this well, but here goes:

We might not be able to prove $A \to B$ in the theory, or even that $\neg □ ⊥$ (which would mean "there are no proofs of inconsistency"). But if we believe our theory is sound, we believe that it can't show that a copy of itself proves something false.

So $A \to □ B$ tells us that if $A$ is true, the theory would show that a copy of itself proves $B$ is true. And this is enough to convince us that we can't simultaneously have $A$ true and $B$ false.

[-]Andrew_Critch3y20

This is cool (and fwiw to other readers) correct. I must reflect on what it means for real world cooperation... I especially like the A <-> []X -> [][]X <-> []A trick.

[-]James Payor3y*57

In case this helps folks' intuition, my generating idea was something like: "look at what my opponent is thinking, but assume that whenever they check if I cooperate, they think the answer is yes". This is how we break the loop.

This results in a proof of the lemma like thus:

(given)
$x \leftrightarrow □ (□ x \to □ (□ x \to x))$ (unrolling one step)
$□ x \to □ (□ x \to x)$ is straightforward intuitively, and we can get there by applying box-distributivity to $□ (x \to (□ x \to x))$

(EDIT: This is basically the same proof as in the post, but less simple. Maybe the interesting part is the "unroll once then break the loop" intuition.)

Relatedly, with two agents $A$ and $B$ , we can have:

$A \leftrightarrow □ (□ A \to B)$ (given)
$B \leftrightarrow □ (□ B \to A)$ (given)
$A \leftrightarrow □ (□ A \to □ (□ B \to A))$ (substituting $B$ into $A$ )
$□ A \to □ (□ B \to A)$ is straightforward as before

[-]James Payor3y40

(In fact, I think "assume they will think I cooperate" turns out to be too strong, and leads to unnecessary defection. I'm still working through the details.)

[-]Amalthea3y00

So, ideally you would like to assume only

□A→B
□B→A

and conclude A and B ?

[-]James Payor3y67

If I follow what you mean, we can derive:

So there's a Löbian proof, in which the provability is self-fulfilling. But this isn't sufficient to avoid this kind of proof.

(Aside on why I don't like the Löbian method: I moreso want the agents to be doing "correct" counterfactual reasoning about how their actions affect their opponent, and to cooperate because they see that mutual cooperation is possible and then choose it. The Löbian proof style isn't a good model of that, imo.)

[-]James Payor9mo40Review for 2023 Review

I continue to think there's something important in here!

I haven't had much success articulating why. I think it's neat that the loop-breaking/choosing can be internalized, and not need to pass through Lob. And it informs my sense of how to distinguish real-world high-integrity vs low-integrity situations.

[-]Raemon9mo10

I haven't had much success articulating why.

I'd be interested in a more in-depth review where you take another pass at this.

[-]orthonormal3y20

Very cool! How does this affect your quest for bounded analogues of Löbian reasoning?

[-]Andrew_Critch3y20

I'm working on it :) At this point what I think is true is the following:

If ShortProof(x \leftrightarrow LongProof(ShortProof(x) \to x)), then MediumProof(x).

Apologies that I haven't written out calculations very precisely yet, but since you asked, that's roughly where I'm at :)

[-]James Payor3y*20

It looks like you're investigating an angle that I can't follow, but here's my two cents re bounded agents:

My main idea to port this to the bounded setting is to have a bot that searches for increasingly long proofs, knowing that if it takes longer to find a proof then it is itself a bit harder to reason about.

We can instantiate this like:

The idea is that if there is a short way to prove that the opponent $B$ would cooperate back, then it takes just a constant $C$ steps more to prove that we cooperate. So it doesn't open us up to exploitation to assume that our own cooperation is provable in $i + C$ steps.

The way in which this works at all is by cutting the loop at the point where the opponent is thinking about our own behaviour. This bot cuts it rather aggressively: it assumes that no matter the context, when $B$ thinks about whether $A$ cooperates, it's provable that $A$ does cooperate. (I think this isn't great and can be improved to a weaker assumption that would lead to more potential cooperation.)

If you construct $B_{n}$ similarly, I claim that $A_{k}$ and $B_{n}$ mutually cooperate if $k$ and $n$ are large enough, and mutually defect otherwise.

Similarly, I claim $A_{k}$ can mutually cooperate with other bots like $B_{n} (A) = □_{n} A (B_{n})$ .

[-]Christopher King3y*00

Wouldn't this also let you prove "not E"? 🤔 I think this system might be inconsistent.

EDIT: nvm, I guess it's assumed that the agents are some kind of FairBot (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/iQWk5jYeDg5ACCmpx/robust-cooperation-in-the-prisoner-s-dilemma#Previously_known__CliqueBot_and_FairBot), which introduces an asymmetry between cooperate and defect.

[-]James Payor3y*67

Intuitively, each agent in the group verifies that "if there is some argument compelling to everyone that we all cooperate, then I think everyone cooperates".

But implicit in the math is "if I can prove that there is no such argument, then the hypothetical is moot, and I cooperate anyway". !!

Is this a feature or a bug? Well I think this is part of how the group is ruling out a consistent world in which .

EDIT: Okay so Lob's theorem says you can never prove in the theory that there are no proofs of $X$ , due to the technicality in which $□ X$ means "a proof of any size". See the followup comments.

Alas I don't understand the $□ (□ E \to E)$ version well enough to give a compelling account of how it works.

[-]Daniel Kokotajlo2y40

So... it's part of the setup that all of these agents will:
--Cooperate if they can prove that there is some argument compelling to everyone that everyone cooperates (because then they prove that everyone cooperates, and that includes them, and their proof system isn't mistaken?)
--Cooperate if they can prove that there is no such argument.
--Else defect.

Am I getting that right?

[-]James Payor2y40

For the setup , it's bit more like: each member cooperates if they can prove that a compelling argument for "everyone cooperates" is sufficient to ensure "everyone cooperates".

Your second line seems right though! If there were provably no argument for straight up "everyone cooperates", i.e. $□ (□ E \to ⊥)$ , this implies $□ (□ E \to E)$ and therefore $E$ , a contradiction.

Also I think I'm a bit less confused here these days, and in case it helps:

Don't forget that " $□ P$ " means "a proof of any size of $P$ ", which is kinda crazy, and can be responsible for things not lining up with your intuition. My hot take is that Lob's theorem / incompleteness says "with finite proof strength you can only deny proofs up to a limited size, on pain of diagonalization". Which is way saner than the usual interpretation!

So idk, especially in this context I think it's a bad idea to throw out your intuition when the math seems to say something else. Since the mismatch is probably coming down to some subtlety in this formalization of provability/meta-methamatics. And I presently think the quirky nature of provability logic is often bugs due to bad choices in the formalism.

[-]Daniel Kokotajlo2y50

Thanks for the reply. I'm a bit over my head here but isn't this a problem for the practicality of this approach? We only get mutual cooperation because all of the agents have the very unusual property that they'll cooperative if they find a proof that there is no such argument. Seems like a selfless and self-destructive property to have in most contexts, why would an agent self-modify into creating and maintaining this property?

[-]James Payor2y*82

(Thanks also to you for engaging!)

Hm. I'm going to take a step back, away from the math, and see if that makes things less confusing.

Let's go back to Alice thinking about whether to cooperate with Bob. They both have perfect models of each other (perhaps in the form of source code).

When Alice goes to think about what Bob will do, maybe she sees that Bob's decision depends on what he thinks Alice will do.

At this junction, I don't want Alice to "recurse", falling down the rabbit hole of "Alice thinking about Bob thinking about Alice thinking about--" and etc.

Instead Alice should realize that she has a choice to make, about who she cooperates with, which will determine the answers Bob finds when thinking about her.

This manouvre is doing a kind of causal surgery / counterfactual-taking. It cuts the loop by identifying "what Bob thinks about Alice" as a node under Alice's control. This is the heart of it, and imo doesn't rely on anything weird or unusual.

[-]James Payor2y*92

I tried to formalize this, using as a "poor man's counterfactual", standing in for "if Alice cooperates then so does Bob". This has the odd behaviour of becoming "true" when Alice defects! You can see this as the counterfactual collapsing and becoming inconsistent, because its premise is violated. But this does mean we need to be careful about using these.

For technical reasons we upgrade to $□ A \to B$ , which says "if Alice cooperates in a legible way, then Bob cooperates back". Alice tries to prove this, and legibly cooperates if so.

This setup gives us "Alice legibly cooperates if she can prove that, if she legibly cooperates, Bob would cooperate back". In symbols, $□ (□ A \to B) \to A$ .

Now, is this okay? What about proving $□ A \to ⊥$ ?

Well, actually you can't ever prove that! Because of Lob's theorem.

Outside the system we can definitely see cases where $A$ is unprovable, e.g. because Bob always defects. But you can't prove this inside the system. You can only prove things like " $□_{k} A \to ⊥$ " for finite proof lengths $k$ .

I think this is best seen as a consequence of "with finite proof strength you can only deny proofs up to a limited size".

So this construction works out, perhaps just because two different weirdnesses are canceling each other out. But in any case I think the underlying idea, "cooperate if choosing to do so leads to a good outcome", is pretty trustworthy. It perhaps deserves to be cached out in better provability math.

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Modal Fixpoint Cooperation without Löb's Theorem

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Discussion

Writing implications backwards

Conclusion