Regarding Chess agents, Vanessa pointed out that while only perfect play is optimal, informally we would consider agents to have an objective that is better served by slightly better play, for example, an agent rated 2500 ELO is better than one rated 1800, which is better than one rated 1000, etc. That means that lots of "chess minds" which are non-optimal are still somewhat rational at their goal.
I think that it's very likely that even according to this looser definition, almost all chess moves, and therefore almost all "possible" chess bots, fail to do m...
I think this was a valuable post, albeit ending up somewhat incorrect about whether LLMs would be agentic - not because they developed the capacity on their own, but because people intentionally built and are building structure around LLMs to enable agency. That said, the underlying point stands - it is very possible that LLMs could be a safe foundation for non-agentic AI, and many research groups are pursuing that today.
I think this post makes an important and still neglected claim that people should write their work more clearly and get it published in academia, instead of embracing the norms of the narrower community they interact with. There has been significant movement in this direction in the past 2 years, and I think this posts marks a critical change in what the community suggests and values in terms of output.
Are you familiar with Davidad's program working on compositional world modeling? (The linked notes are from before the program was launched, there is ongoing work on the topic.)
The reason I ask is because embedded agents and agents in multi-agent settings should need compositional world models that include models of themselves and other agents, which implies that hierarchical agency is included in what they would need to solve.
It also relates closely to work Vanessa is doing (as an "ARIA Creator") in learning theoretic AI, related to what she has cal...
I have a lot more to say about this, and think it's worth responding to in much greater detail, but I think that overall, the post criticizes Omhundro and Tegmark's more extreme claims somewhat reasonably, though very uncharitably, and then assumes that other proposals which seem to be related, especially Dalyrymple et al. approach, are essentially the same, and doesn't engage with the specific proposal at all.
To be very specific about how I think the post in unreasonable, there are a number of places where a seeming steel-man version of the proposals are ...
I'll note that I think this is a mistake that lots of people working in AI safety have made, ignoring the benefits of academic credentials and prestige because of the obvious costs and annoyance. It's not always better to work in academia, but it's also worth really appreciating the costs of not doing so in foregone opportunities and experience, as Vanessa highlighted. (Founder effects matter; Eliezer had good reasons not to pursue this path, but I think others followed that path instead of evaluating the question clearly for their own work.)
And in m...
A story of how that happens:
In future (unsafe but) sophisticated systems, models will have access to external storage, and be given the ability to read/write. For example, AutoGPT-like systems will have shared scratchpads across instances of the model, to coordinate with themselves. It seems instrumentally convergent for such systems to store things related to their true / eventual goals in such places, for example, so that they can be referenced by local instances. And if we do some sort of oversight of that data storage, key facts that the model wants to...
For a defense of people pursuing a mathematical approach of a type you think isn't valuable, see my recent post.
(That does not address the correct issue you raised about requisite variety, but some work on HRAD does do so explicitly - such as embedded agency.)
I think it would be really good to come up with a framing of these intuitions that wouldn't be controversial.
That seems great, I'd be very happy for someone to write this up more clearly. My key point was about people's claims and confidence about safety, and yes, clearly that was communicated less well than I hoped.
That's true - and from what I can see, this emerges from the culture in academia. There, people are doing research, and the goal is to see if something can be done, or to see what happens if you try something new. That's fine for discovery, but it's insufficient for safety. And that's why certain types of research, ones that pose dangers to researchers or the public, have at least some degree of oversight which imposes safety requirements. ML does not, yet.
I probably put in an extra 20-60 hours, so the total is probably closer to 150 - which surprises me. I will add that a lot of the conversion time was dealing with writing more, LaTeX figures and citations, which were all, I think, substantive valuable additions. (Changing to a more scholarly style was not substantively valuable, nor was struggling with latex margins and TikZ for the diagrams, and both took some part of the time.)
I think that the costs usually are worth it far more often than it occurs, from an outside view - which was David's point, and what I was trying to respond to. I think that it's more valuable than one expects to actually just jump through the hoops. And especially for people who haven't yet ever had any outputs actually published, they really should do that at least once.
(Also, sorry for the zombie reply.)
You're very unusually proactive, and I think the median member of the community would be far better served if they were more engaged the way you are. Doing that without traditional peer reviewed work is fine, but unusual, and in many ways is more difficult than peer-reviewed publication. And for early career researchers, I think it's hard to be taken seriously without some more legible record - you have a PhD, but many others don't.
To respond briefly, I think that people underinvest in (D), and write sub-par forum posts rather than aim for the degree of clarity that would allow them to do (E) at far less marginal cost. I agree that people overinvest in (B)[1], but also think that it's very easy to tell yourself your work is "actual progress" when you're doing work that, if submitted to peer-reviewed outlets, would be quickly demolished as duplicative of work you're unaware of, or incompletely thought-out in other ways.
I also worry that many people have never written a peer reviewed p...
There have also been plenty of other adapatations, ones which were not low-effort. I worked on 2, the Goodhart's law paper and a paper with Issa Rice on HRAD. Both were very significantly rewritten and expanded into "real" preprints, but I think it was clearly worthwhile.
If someone says the opportunity cost is not worth it for them, I see that as a claim that a priori might be true or false. Your post seems to imply that almost everyone is making an error in the same direction, and therefore funders should put their thumb on the scale. That’s at least not obvious to me.
I do think this is the wrong calculation, and the error caused by it is widely shared and pushes in the same direction.
Publication is a public good, where most of the benefit accrues to others / the public. Obviously costs to individuals are higher tha...
If we compare
it seems obvious to me that everyone has an incentive to underinvest in (A) relative to (B). You get grants & jobs & status from (B), not (A), right? And papers can be in (B) without being minimally or not at all in (A).
In academia, people talk all the time about how people are optimizing their publication record to the detriment of field-advancement, e.g. making results sound misleadingly original and important, chasing things that are hot, splitting results into unnecessari...
So the code that wires a 100-trillion-synapse human brain is about 7.5 megabytes. Now an adult human contains a lot more information than this.
Minor quibble which seems to have implications - "There is a consensus that there are roughly about 100 billion neurons total in the human brain. Each of these neurons can have up to 15,000 connections with other neurons via synapses"
My rough understanding is that babies' brains greatly increase how many synapses there are until age 2 or 3, then these are eliminated or become silent in older children and adult...
Thinking about this a bit, (not a huge amount,) I think the specific example "are bugs real" ends up looking interesting in part because the word "bugs" in the prompt has incredibly low likelihood. (As does the following word, "real")
So the model is conditioning on very low likelihood inputs, which seems like part of the reason for the behavior.
I think what you call grader-optimization is trivially about how a target diverges from the (unmeasured) true goal, which is adversarial goodhart (as defined in paper, especially how we defined Campbell’s Law, not the definition in the LW post.)
And the second paper's taxonomy, in failure mode 3, lays out how different forms of adversarial optimization in a multi-agent scenario relate to Goodhart's law, in both goal poisoning and optimization theft cases - and both of these seem relevant to the questions you discussed in terms of grader-optimization.
This relates closely to how to "solve" Goodhart problems in general. Multiple metrics / graders make exploitation more complex, but have other drawbacks. I discussed the different approaches in my paper here, albeit in the realm of social dynamics rather than AI safety.
This seems great!
If you are continuing work in this vein, I'd be interested in you looking at how these dynamics relate to different Goodhart failure modes, as we expanded on here. I think that much of the problem relates to specific forms of failure, and that paying attention to those dynamics could be helpful. I also think they accelerate in the presence of multiple agents - and I think the framework I pointed to here might be useful.
Is the best way to suggest how to do political and policy strategy, or coordination, to post it publicly on Lesswrong? This seems obviously suboptimal, and I'd think that you should probably ask for feedback and look into how to promote cooperation privately first.
That said, I think everything you said here is correct on an object level, and worth thinking about.
Strongly agree. Three examples of work I've put on Arxiv which originated from the forum, which might be helpful as a touchstone. The first was cited 7 times the first year, and 50 more times since. The latter two were posted last year, and have not been indexed by Google as having been cited yet.
As an example of a technical but fairly conceptual paper, there is the Categorizing Goodhart's law paper. I pushed for this to be a paper rather than just a post, and I think that the resulting exposure was very worthwhile. Scott wrote the original pos...
That's correct. My point is that measuring goals which are not natural to measure will, in general, have many more problems with Goodharting and similar misoptimization and overoptimization pressures. And other approaches can be more productive, or at least more care is needed with design of metrics rather than discovery of what to measure and how.
I think this is going to be wrong as an approach. Weight and temperature are properties of physical systems at specific points in time, and can be measured coherently because we understand laws about those systems. Alignment could be measured as a function of a particular system at a specific point in time, once we have a clear understanding of what? All of human values?
I'm not arguing that "alignment" specifically is the thing we should be measuring.
More generally, a useful mantra is "we do not get to choose the ontology". In this context, it means that there are certain things which are natural to measure (like temperature and weight), and we do not get to pick what they are; we have to discover what they are.
Please feel free to repost this elsewhere, and/or tell people about it.
And if there is anyone interested in this type of job, but is currently still in school or for other reasons is unable to work full time at present, we encourage them to apply and note the circumstances, as we may be able to find other ways to support their work, or at least collaborate and provide mentorship.
In the post, I wanted to distinguish between two things you're now combining; how hard alignment is, and how long we have. And yes, combining these, we get the issue of how hard it will be to solve alignment in the time frame we have until we need to solve it. But they are conceptually distinct.
And neither of these directly relates to takeoff speed, which in the current framing is something like the time frame from when we have systems that are near-human until they hit a capability discontinuity. You said "First off, takeoff speed and timing are correlate...
Relevant to this agenda are the failure modes I discussed in my multi-agent failures paper, which seems worth looking at in this context.
I'm skeptical that many of the problems with aggregation don't both apply to actual individual human values once extrapolated, and generalize to AIs with closely related values, but I'd need to lay out the case for that more clearly. (I did discuss the difficulty of cooperation even given compatible goals a bit in this paper, but it's nowhere near complete in addressing this issue.)
This seems fragile in ways that make me less optimistic about the approach overall. We have strong reasons to think that value aggregation is intractable, and (by analogy,) in some ways the problem of coherence in CEV is the tricky part. That is, the problem of making sure that we're not Dutch book-able is, IIRC, NP-complete, and even worse, the problem of aggregating preferences has several impossibility results.
Edit: To clarify, I'm excited about the approach overall, and think it's likely to be valuable, but this part seems like a big problem.
This post is both a huge contribution, giving a simpler and shorter explanation of a critical topic, with a far clearer context, and has been useful to point people to as an alternative to the main sequence. I wouldn't promote it as more important than the actual series, but I would suggest it as a strong alternative to including the full sequence in the 2020 Review. (Especially because I suspect that those who are very interested are likely to have read the full sequence, and most others will not even if it is included.)
Yes on point Number 1, and partly on point number 2.
If humans don't have incredibly complete models for how to achieve their goals, but know they want a glass of water, telling the AI to put a cup of H2O in front of them can create weird mistakes. This can even happen because of causal connections the humans are unaware of. The AI might have better causal models than the humans, but still cause problems for other reasons. In this case, a human might not know the difference between normal water and heavy water, but the AI might decide that since there are t...
This seems really exciting, and I'd love to chat about how betrayal is similar to or different than manipulation. Specifically, I think the framework I proposed in my earlier multi-agent failure modes paper might be helpful in thinking through the categorization. (But note that I don't endorse thinking of everything as Goodhart's law, despite that paper - though I still think it's technically true, it's not as useful as I had hoped.)
On the topic of growth rate of computing power, it's worth noting that we expect the model which experts have to be somewhat more complex that what we represented as "Moore's law through year " - but as with the simplification regarding CPU/GPU/ASIC compute, I'm unsure how much this is really a crux for anyone about the timing for AGI.
I would be very interested to hear from anyone who said, for example, "I would expect AGI by 2035 if Moore's law continues, but I expect it to end before 2030, and it will therefore likely take until 2050 to reach HLMI/AGI."
This seems reasonable, though efficacy of the learning method seems unclear to me.
But:
This seems wrong. To pick on myself, my peer reviewed papers, my substack, my lesswrong posts, my 1990s blog posts, and my twitter feed are all substantively different in ways that I think the author vector should capture.