I wonder if work on AI for epistemics could be great for mitigating the "gradually cede control of the Earth to AGI" threat model. A large majority of economic and political power is held by people who would strongly oppose human extinction, so I expect that "lack of political support for stopping human extinction" would be less of a bottleneck than "consensus that we're heading towards human extinction" and "consensus on what policy proposals will solve the problem". Both of these could be significantly accelerated by AI. Normally, one of my biggest concerns about "AI for epistemics" is that we might not have much time to get good use of the epistemic assistance before the end — but if the idea is that we'll have AGI for many years (as we're gradually heading towards extinction) then there will be plenty of time.

Yeah I was imagining we can proliferate by 'gradient descenting' on similar cases.

What is this referring to? Are you thinking about something like: varying small facts about the scenario to get a function from “details of the scenario”->p(escape attempt) and then switch to a scenario with a higher p and then repeat?

it sounds to me like ruling this out requires an assumption about the correlations of an action being the same as the correlations of an earlier self-modifying action to enforce that later action.

I would guess that assumption would be sufficient to defeat my counter-example, yeah.

I do think this is a big assumption. Definitely not one that I'd want to generally assume for practical purposes, even if it makes for a nicer theory of decision theory. But it would be super interesting if someone could make a proper defense of it typically being true in practice.

E.g.: Is it really true that a human's decision about whether or not to program a seed AI to take action A has the same correlations as that same superintelligence deciding whether or not to take action A 1000 years later while using a jupiter brain for its computation? Intuitively, I'd say that the human would correlate mostly with other humans and other evolved species, and that the superintelligence would mostly correlate with other superintelligences, and it'd be a big deal if that wasn't true.

However, there is no tiling theorem for UDT that I am aware of, which means we don't know whether UDT is reflectively consistent; it's only a conjecture.

I think this conjecture is probably false for reasons described in this section of "When does EDT seek evidence about correlations?". The section offers an argument for why son-of-EDT isn't UEDT, but I think it generalizes to an argument for why son-of-UEDT isn't UEDT.

Briefly: UEDT-at-timestep-1 is making a different decision than UEDT-at-timestep-0. This means that its decision might be correlated (according to the prior) with some facts which UEDT-at-timestep-0's decision isn't correlated with. From the perspective of UEDT-at-timestep-0, it's bad to let UEDT-at-timestep-1 make decisions on the basis of correlations with things that UEDT-at-timestep-0 can't control.

Notice that learning-UDT implies UDT: an agent eventually behaves as if it were applying UDT with each Pn. Therefore, in particular, it eventually behaves like UDT with prior P0. So (with the exception of some early behavior which might not conform to UDT at all) this is basically UDT with a prior which allows for learning. The prior P0 is required to eventually agree with the recommendations of P1, P2, ... (which also implies that these eventually agree with each other).

I don't understand this argument.

"an agent eventually behaves as if it were applying UDT with each Pn" — why can't an agent skip over some Pn entirely or get stuck on P9 or whatever?

"Therefore, in particular, it eventually behaves like UDT with prior P0." even granting the above — sure, it will beahve like UDT with prior p0 at some point. But then after that it might have some other prior. Why would it stick with P0?

I like this direction and this write-up of it!

If sample efficiency was reasonably high, then we overall feel like control could be workable in the regime where for some tasks we need AIs to use huge (e.g. the equivalent of 3 months of human thinking) but not insane (e.g. the equivalent of 1,000 years of human thinking) amounts of uninterpretable serial reasoning.

Let's assume that an AI lab is in a fast-paced, rapidly changing state of affairs. (As you might expect during a moderately fast takeoff.) If an AI then gets to do the equivalent of 3 months of thinking, it could use that to do notably more serial thinking about how to exploit the current situation than any human has done (because some important features of the current situation is less than 3 months old: e.g. you had to switch to an importantly different programming language, or some different type of communication protocol between AIs, or change your AI safety research paradigm in a way you didn't expect). I'm curious how you'd ensure (or evaluate for) red-team competitiveness in this case.

I think (5) also depends on further details.

As you have written it, both the 2023 and 2033 attempt uses similar data and similar compute.

But in my proposed operationalization, "you can get it to do X" is allowed to use a much greater amount of resources ("say, 1% of the pre-training budget") than the test for whether the model is "capable of doing X" ("Say, at most 1000 data points".)

I think that's important:

• If both the 2023 and the 2033 attempt are really cheap low-effort attempts, then I don't think that the experiment is very relevant for whether "you can get it to do X" in the sort of high-stakes, high-efforts situations that I'm imagining that we'll be in when we're trying to eval/align AI models to avoid takeover.
  • It seems super plausible that a low-effort attempt could fail, and then succeed later-on with 10 more years knowledge of best practices. I wouldn't learn much from that happening once.
• If both the 2023 and the 2033 attempts are really expensive and high-effort (e.g. 1% of pre-training budget), then I think it's very plausible that the 2033 training run gave the model new capabilities that it didn't have before.
  • And in particular: capabilities that the model wouldn't have been able to utilize in a takeover attempt that it was very motivated to do its best at. (Which is ultimately what we care about.)

By a similar argument, I would think that (4) wouldn't falsify the hypothesis as-written, but would falsify the hypothesis if the first run was a much more high-effort attempt. With lots of iteration by a competent team, and more like a $1,000,000 budget. But the 2nd run, with a much more curated and high-quality dataset, still just used $1,000 of training compute.

One thing that I'm noticing while writing this is something like: The argument that "elicitation efforts would get to use ≥1% of the training budget" makes sense if we're eliciting all the capabilities at once, or if there's only a few important capabilities to elicit. But if we want to elicit ≥1000 different capabilities, and need to do separate attempts at each of them, then it's unlikely that each attempt will get to use ≥1% of the training budget.

And for low-effort elicitation attempts, there'll just always be a good chance that capability-elicitation fails for random reasons unrelated to sand-bagging. So a prediction that elicitation consistently succeeds will easily be falsified.

Not super sure what to do with that. One source of hope might be: If the model systematically tries sandbagging, and you can strongly finetune against that on 10 different types of capabilities, then there's a good chance that you'll have trained-out the sandbagging impulse across a much wider array of data. So maybe you can just do 10 high-effort elicitation attempts, on a random subset of capabilities, and hope that it generalizes. (This is basically an argument that there eventually won't be ≥1000 different capabilities which requires separate elicitation efforts. Because there will be one fundamental thing that you need: "getting the model to always try its best and not try to sandbag".)

Even just priors on how large effect sizes of interventions are feels like it brings it under 10x unless there are more detailed arguments given for 10x, but I'll give some more specific thoughts below.

Hm, at the scale of "(inter-)national policy", I think you can get quite large effect sizes. I don't know large the effect-sizes of the following are, but I wouldn't be surprised by 10x or greater for:

• Regulation of nuclear power leading to reduction in nuclear-related harms. (Compared to a very relaxed regulatory regime.)
• Regulation of pharmaceuticals leading to reduced side-effects from drugs. (Compared to a regime where people can mostly sell what they want, and drugs only get banned after people notice that they're causing harm.)
• Worker protection standards. (Wikipedia claims that the Netherlands has a ~17x lower rate of fatal workplace accidents than the US, which is ~22x lower than India.) I don't know what's driving the differences here, but the difference between the US and Netherlands suggests that it's not all "individuals can afford to take lower risks in richer countries".

Are you thinking about exploration hacking, here, or gradient hacking as distinct from exploration hacking?

Instead, ARC explicitly tries to paint the moratorium folks as "extreme".

Are you thinking about this post? I don't see any explicit claims that the moratorium folks are extreme. What passage are you thinking about?