A hand-drawn presentation on the idea of an 'Untrollable Mathematician' - a mathematical agent that can't be manipulated into believing false things.
I think the core argument is "if you want to slow down, or somehow impose restrictions on AI research and deployment, you need some way of defining thresholds. Also, most policymaker's cruxes appear to be that AI will not be a big deal, but if they thought it was going to be a big deal they would totally want to regulate it much more. Therefore, having policy proposals that can use future eval results as a triggering mechanism is politically more feasible, and also, epistemically helpful since it allows people who do think it will be a big deal to establish a track record".
I find these arguments reasonably compelling, FWIW.
Work that I’ve done on techniques for mitigating risk from misaligned AI often makes a number of conservative assumptions about the capabilities of the AIs we’re trying to control. (E.g. the original AI control paper, Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threats, How to prevent collusion when using untrusted models to monitor each other.) For example:
Epistemic status: This is an off-the-cuff question.
~5 years ago there was a lot of exciting progress on game playing through reinforcement learning (RL). Now we have basically switched paradigms, pretraining massive LLMs on ~the internet and then apparently doing some really trivial unsophisticated RL on top of that - this is successful and highly popular because interacting with LLMs is pretty awesome (at least if you haven't done it before) and they "feel" a lot more like A.G.I. Probably there's somewhat more commercial use as well via code completion (and some would say many other tasks, personally not really convinced - generative image/video models will certainly be profitable though). There's also a sense in which they are clearly more general - e.g. one RL algorithm may learn...
Do you mean that seeing the opponent make dumb moves makes the AI infer that its own moves are also supposed to be dumb, or something else?
Can LLMs science? The answer to this question can tell us important things about timelines to AGI. In this small pilot experiment, we test frontier LLMs on their ability to perform a minimal version of scientific research, where they must discover a hidden rule about lists of integers by iteratively generating and testing hypotheses. Results are ambiguous: they're mostly pretty bad at it but top systems show apparent signs of life. We're working on a larger, more rigorous experiment, and we really want your input.
In this post we:
As a partial point of comparison, in Wason's testing only about 20% of humans solved the problem tested, but Wason's experiment differed in two important ways: first, subjects were deliberately given a misleading example, and second, only one task was tested (our easiest-rated task, 'strictly increasing order').
I encourage you to get some humans to take the same test you gave the models, so that we have a better human baseline. It matters a lot for what the takeaways should be, if LLMs are already comparable or better to humans at this task vs. still significantly worse.
Current take on the implications of "GPT-4b micro": Very powerful, very cool, ~zero progress to AGI, ~zero existential risk. Cheers.
First, the gist of it appears to be:
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