Summary: We propose measuring AI performance in terms of the length of tasks AI agents can complete. We show that this metric has been consistently exponentially increasing over the past 6 years, with a doubling time of around 7 months. Extrapolating this trend predicts that, in under five years, we will see AI agents that can independently complete a large fraction of software tasks that currently take humans days or weeks.

The length of tasks (measured by how long they take human professionals) that generalist frontier model agents can complete autonomously with 50% reliability has been doubling approximately every 7 months for the last 6 years. The shaded region represents 95% CI calculated by hierarchical bootstrap over task families, tasks, and task attempts.

Full paper | Github repo

Blogpost; tweet thread.

AI1
Frontpage
New Comment


11 comments, sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

This is probably the most important single piece of evidence about AGI timelines right now. Well done! I think the trend should be superexponential, e.g. each doubling takes 10% less calendar time on average. Eli Lifland and I did some calculations yesterday suggesting that this would get to AGI in 2028. Will do more serious investigation soon.

Why do I expect the trend to be superexponential? Well, it seems like it sorta has to go superexponential eventually. Imagine: We've got to AIs that can with ~100% reliability do tasks that take professional humans 10 years. But somehow they can't do tasks that take professional humans 160 years? And it's going to take 4 more doublings to get there? And these 4 doublings are going to take 2 more years to occur? No, at some point you "jump all the way" to AGI, i.e. AI systems that can do any length of task as well as professional humans -- 10 years, 100 years, 1000 years, etc.

Also, zooming in mechanistically on what's going on, insofar as an AI system can do tasks below length X but not above length X, it's gotta be for some reason -- some skill that the AI lacks, which isn't important for tasks below length X but which tends to be crucial for tasks above length X. But there are only a finite number of skills that humans have that AIs lack, and if we were to plot them on a horizon-length graph (where the x-axis is log of horizon length, and each skill is plotted on the x-axis where it starts being important, such that it's not important to have for tasks less than that length) the distribution of skills by horizon length would presumably taper off, with tons of skills necessary for pretty short tasks, a decent amount necessary for medium tasks (but not short), and a long thin tail of skills that are necessary for long tasks (but not medium), a tail that eventually goes to 0, probably around a few years on the x-axis. So assuming AIs learn skills at a constant rate, we should see acceleration rather than a constant exponential. There just aren't that many skills you need to operate for 10 days that you don't also need to operate for 1 day, compared to how many skills you need to operate for 1 hour that you don't also need to operate for 6 minutes.

There are two other factors worth mentioning which aren't part of the above: One, the projected slowdown in capability advances that'll come as compute and data scaling falters due to becoming too expensive. And two, pointing in the other direction, the projected speedup in capability advances that'll come as AI systems start substantially accelerating AI R&D.

Doesn't the trend line already take into account the effect you are positing? ML research engineers already say they get significant and increasing productivity boosts from AI assistants and have been for some time. I think the argument you are making is double-counting this. (Unless you want to argue that the kink with Claude is the start of the super-exponential, which we would presumably get data on pretty soon).

I indeed think that AI assistance has been accelerating AI progress. However, so far the effect has been very small, like single-digit percentage points. So it won't be distinguishable in the data from zero. But in the future if trends continue the effect will be large, possibly enough to more than counteract the effect of scaling slowing down, possibly not, we shall see.

Research engineers I talk to already report >3x speedups from AI assistants. It seems like that has to be enough that it would be showing up in the numbers. My null hypothesis would be that programmer productivity is increasing exponentially and has been for ~2 years, and this is already being taken into account in the curves, and without this effect you would see a slower (though imo not massively slower) exponential.

(This would argue for dropping the pre-2022 models from the graph which I think would give slightly faster doubling times, on the order of 5-6 months if I had to eyeball.).

Research engineers I talk to already report >3x speedups from AI assistants

Huh, I would be extremely surprised by this number. I program most days, in domains where AI assistance is particularly useful (frontend programming with relatively high churn), and I am definitely not anywhere near 3x total speedup. Maybe a 1.5x, maybe a 2x on good weeks, but definitely not a 3x. A >3x in any domain would be surprising, and my guess is generalization for research engineer code (as opposed to churn-heavy frontend development) is less.

I think my front-end productivity might be up 3x? A shoggoth helped me building a stripe shop and do a ton of UI design that I would’ve been hesitant to take on myself (without hiring someone else to work with), as well as quality increase in speed of churning through front-end designs.

(This is going from “wouldn’t take on the project due to low skill” to “can take it on and deliver it in a reasonable amount of time”, which is different from “takes top programmer and speeds them up 3x”.)

I agree with habryka that the current speedup is probably substantially less than 3x.

However, worth keeping in mind that if it were 3x for engineering the overall AI progress speedup would be substantially lower, due to (a) non-engineering activities having a lower speedup, (b) compute bottlenecks, (c) half of the default pace of progress coming from compute.

My null hypothesis would be that programmer productivity is increasing exponentially and has been for ~2 years, and this is already being taken into account in the curves, and without this effect you would see a slower (though imo not massively slower) exponential

Exponential growth alone doesn't imply a significant effect here, if the current absolute speedup is low.

I'm not at all convinced it has to be something discrete like "skills" or "achieved general intelligence". 

There are many continuous factors that I can imagine that help planning long tasks.

I'm not sure if I understand what you are saying. It sounds like you are accusing me of thinking that skills are binary--either you have them or you don't. I agree, in reality many skills are scalar instead of binary; you can have them to greater or lesser degrees. I don't think that changes the analysis much though.

This has been one of the most important results for my personal timelines to date. It was a big part of the reason why I recently updated from ~3 year median to ~4 year median to AI that can automate >95% of remote jobs from 2022, and why my distribution overall has become more narrow (less probability on really long timelines).

I really don't think this is a reasonable measure for ability to do long term tasks, but I don't have the time or energy to fight this battle, so I'll just register my prediction that this paper is not going to age well.